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EXPLORING IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION
IN CYBERSPACE
OscAR H. GANDY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
This article is concerned with the relationship between iden-
tity and identification in the realm of cyberspace transactions.
Philip Agre suggests that the commercialization of the Internet
has increased the level of public concern about the ways in which
personally identifiable information can be captured and used.'
The demands of the marketplace have shaped and reflected the
ways in which the capture of this information is automated and
normalized. The marketplace may also have helped shape the
consequences that flow from this normalization. This possibility
is worthy of our concern.
Central to the discussion of the capture and use of personal
information is the critical distinction between identity and identi-
fication. This distinction is based upon an elaborated notion of
agency, or individual autonomy. Identity is associated with indi-
vidual agency because it is related to the ability of the individual
to shape her identity beyond the gaze and influence of powerful
others. Those who advocate the defense of privacy against the
threats of technology and social practice do so, in part, because
of the belief that the "right to be left alone" is fundamental to
the development of the autonomous individual.2 Identification
on the other hand, is understood in the context of the exercise
of power and authority. Identification may be appreciated as an
element of constraint within the process of structuration that
Anthony Giddens has helped us comprehend.3
This article will also explore many of the tensions that have
emerged within the evolving discourse on technology. Conflict is
* Herbert I. Schiller Information and Society Professor, Annenberg
School for Communication University of Pennsylvania.
1. See Philip Agre, The Architecture of Identity: Embedding Privacy in Market
Institutions, 2 COMM. & Soc'y 1, 25 (1999).
2. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv.
193, 193-220 (1890); see also Katrin Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a
Model of Privacy for the Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COM-
PUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1998).
3. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETr. OUTLINE OF A
THEORY OF STRUCrUxRATION (1984).
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especially sharp with regard to the extent to which feasibility
determines necessity. Jacques Ellul's engagement with "la tech-
nique" suggests that the availability of a technique not only
invites, but demands its use.4 Technological systems become
defined as essential long before the claims made on their behalf
have been weighed in the balance of private and social benefits
and costs.5 Widespread use contributes to the expectation of
use.' Media coverage facilitates the normalization of a rationale
of business necessity as a justification for expanded use. Business
necessity is a primary justification for the use of the technologies
of identification as adjuncts to traditional methods of drawing
invidious distinctions among members of disfavored groups.7
This article is critical of business practices, as well as the
rationales presented in their defense. It is especially critical of
the justifications that are presented in support of the use of trans-
action-generated information in the development of predictive
models that guide interactions with individuals in their roles as
employees, citizens and consumers. At the core of this critique is
a challenge to the use of statistical information as an aid to deci-
sion-making. The widespread view that statistical discrimination
is both rational and efficient will be challenged on both technical
and ethical grounds.' I will argue that the use of group averages
as a basis for discrimination is always problematic from the per-
spective of those on the long side of any contested exchange.9
Although there is an extensive literature that has followed
efforts to limit the impact of discrimination in the areas of
employment,' ° education,"' insurance, 12 housing,13 law enforce-
4. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkenson
trans., 1964).
5. See GENE RoCHLIN, TRAPPED IN THE NET: THE UNANTICIPATED CONSE-
QUENCES OF COMPUTERIZATION (1997).
6. See DAN SCHILLER, DIGITAL CAPITALISM: NETWORKING THE GLOBAL MAR-
KETING SYSTEM (1999).
7. See Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An
Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. L. FORUM 77, 137.
8. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 151-66 (1997).
9. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Political Economy of Contested
Exchange, in RETHINKING POWER 196-224 (Thomas E. Wartenberg ed., 1992)
(discussing a variety of circumstances in which there is a marked power imbal-
ance between two actors. In the case of employment relations, the employer,
who can select from a great many potential employees, is said to be on the
"short side" of the market. The employee, who is constrained by the relatively
small number of equivalent opportunities for employment, is said to be on the
"long side," and thereby at a distinct disadvantage in negotiating contracts).
10. See Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: The-
oiy and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 799, 836-37 (1985).
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ment,14 and even in the area of environmental justice, 5 the
forms of discrimination especially likely to be encountered in the
Internet environment are just beginning to attract scholarly
attention. This article will explore the ways in which marketing
discrimination 6 promises to introduce distortions into the
sphere of e-commerce. Special attention will be paid to the ways
in which these distortions will transform the market for informa-
tion. The central role which access to information plays in the
democratic process is the basis for special concern about this
threat.
17
The nature of discrimination against groups defined by race
is familiar terrain. Yet, race is just one of the markers that are
used to identify groups whose mistreatment demands our atten-
tion. We have seen the list of suspect categories expanded to
include gender, age, and sexual orientation when they have been
used as the basis for discrimination. This expansion has been
based in part on the recognition that "differences from the com-
munity norm" can be the basis of invidious distinctions. 8 How-
ever, an expanding pattern of discrimination against non-racial
groups19 presents us with a difficulty in deciding which group is
11. See Vincent J. Roscigno, Race and the Reproduction of Educational Disad-
vantage, 76 Soc. FORCES 1033 (1998).
12. See Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L.
REv. 517 (1983).
13. See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of LendingDiscrimination: A Law
and Economics Analysis, 73 TEx. L. REv. 787 (1995); see also Michael F. Ferguson
& Stephen R. Peters, What Constitutes Evidence of Discrimination in Lending?, 50J.
FIN. 739, 748 (1995).
14. See SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY,
AND CRIME IN AMERICA (1996).
15. See Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REv. 75,
151 (1996).
16. See Timothy C. Lambert, Note, Fair Marketing, Challenging Pre-Applica-
tion Lending Practices, 87 GEO. L.J. 2181 (1999).
17. See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNI-
CATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (1999); see also Douglas Kellner, New Technol-
ogies, the Welfare State, and the Prospects for Democratization, in COMMUNICATION,
CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL POLICY- RETHINKING THE LIMITS OF THE WELFARE STATE
239-56 (Andrew Calabrese & Jean-Claude Burgelman eds., 1999).
18. Ian F. Haney-Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to Lat-
Crit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1203-05 (1997) (citing Hernandez v. Texas,
251 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952), reu'd, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), where a
Mexican American was denied the right to appeal discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment because he was defined as White, and therefore not
subject to racial discrimination).
19. See Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., It's Discrimination Stupid," in RESISTING THE
VIRTUAL LIFE: THE CULTURE AND POLITICS OF INFORMATION 35 (James Brooks &
Ian Boal eds., 1995).
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most deserving of protection.2" The identification of these
groups is made difficult by the need to consider the markers of
group boundaries that are both visible and immutable, and those
that are made visible only by means of statistical analysis.
I. IDENTITY
Identity formation is readily understood as a part of the pro-
cess of individual development. The development of an identity
distinct from that of one's parents is part of a tortured passage
through adolescence.2 1 Once formed, the identity of an individ-
ual is still complex and multidimensional. An individual's iden-
tity can be represented structurally as a multi-layered array. Near
the base, we would expect to find the more stable foundations,
perhaps reflective of racial, ethnic, gender, and perhaps political,
national, or ideological identities. Higher, and moving out from
the central core, we would find variations in the salience of par-
ticular aspects of identity reflecting the influence of situational
cues." The more central aspects of a person's identity function
as resources and constraints that organize critical aspects of their
daily lives.
It is important to note that individual identities are formed
in interaction with others.23 The characteristics of those interac-
tions help to determine the salience, as well as the level of com-
fort with which different aspects of one's identity co-exist.2 4 Self-
esteem, or how an individual feels about herself is determined, in
part, by the ways in which her relevant reference groups are eval-
uated by others.25 The salience of racial and ethnic aspects of
one's identity is determined by the interaction of a number of
contextual factors. They include the distribution of political
power and social status, the extent of residential segregation and
occupational concentration, and the clarity with which racial or
20. See Charles Raab & Colin Bennett, The Distribution of Privacy Risks: Who
Needs Protection , 14 INFO. Soc'v 263, 274 (1998).
21. See ERIK. H. ERICKSON, IDENTIY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968).
22. See HARRY H.L. KrrANo, RACE RELATIONS 84-96 (1991).
23. See William E. Cross, Jr., Oppositional Identity and African American
Youth: Issues and Prospects, in TOWARD A COMMON DESTINY- IMPROVING RACE AND
ETHNIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA 185, 203 (Willis D. Hawley & Anthony W. Jackson
eds., 1995).
24. See STEPHEN CORNELL & DOUGLAss HARTMANN, ETHNICITY AND RACE:
MAKING IDENTITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD (1998).
25. Richard H. McAdams argues that racial discrimination and other hos-
tile acts may be understood as attempts to build self-esteem by lowering the
status of competing groups. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:
The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L.
REV. 1003, 1084 (1995).
2000] EXPLORING IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN CYBERSPACE 1089
ethnic distinctions are emphasized in routine interactions. 26 The
mass media have also been identified as playing a critical role in
the development of personal identity because of the ways in
which media provide individuals with indirect access to the
experiences of others.27 A concern with the media's representa-
tion of racial and ethnic groups is based in part upon a belief
that popular media provide representations that reinforce
existing stereotypes. Those stereotypes help shape the ways in
which people relate to each other.
28
Because identity is formed through direct and mediated
interaction with others, individuals are never free to develop pre-
cisely as they would wish. Parents, friends, and a host of authori-
ties and interested parties actively seek to influence their
evolution. On the basis of claims regarding the superiority of
group interests over individual sensibilities, a host of public, and
not so public figures have been called upon to expose or high-
light one aspect of their identity more prominently than they
might have wished.29 Identification as a member of a group rec-
ognized in law may bring both benefits and harms."0 Identifica-
26. See id. at 1090.
27. See DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM HOYNES, MEDIA/SOCIETY: INDUSTRIES,
IMAGES, AND AUDIENCES 261-94 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the concept of an
"active audience" that interprets media representations. This is a view that
rejects the more deterministic models of causality that emphasize the cultiva-
tion of social perceptions); see also Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, A Theory of Media
Power and a Theory of Media Use: Different Stories, Questions, and Ways of Thinking, 1
MASS COMM. & Soc'Y 5, 40 (1998).
28. See OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., COMMUNICATION AND RACE: A STRUCTURAL
PERSPECTIVE (1998); see also JODY ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE
RACISM: THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997) (discussing the
influence of racial stereotypes on social interaction); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the
Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 351, 366 (1997) (commenting on
media externalities).
29. See PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POITICS OF INT1MATE LIFE 132
(1996) (exploring the strategic "outing" of prominent homosexuals. Although
Boling suggests that the long term impact of forcing individuals "out of the
closet" may be less than desirable, proponents argue that it is essential for the
movement to be able to eliminate any connection between shame and homo-
sexual identity).
30. Racial identification is a complex and uncertain process, due in no
small part to the absence of any reliable authority. Its importance is increas-
ingly linked to claims regarding rights and opportunities that have the charac-
ter of licenses. See, e.g., Michael Omi, Racial Identification and the State: The
Dilemma of Classification, 15 LAw & INEQ.J. 7 (1997) (discussing racial and ethnic
classification). With regard to racial identification as a form of property right,
see Jim Chen, Affirmative Action: Diversity of Opinions: Embryonic Thoughts on
Racial Identity as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1123 (1997); Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) (discussing racial privilege
as a property interest defended as a right); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing
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tion with others may be the source of great pleasure and a sense
of fulfillment. Identification by others is often experienced as an
ungranted exercise of power.31
II. IDENTIFICATION
We understand identification as a process that varies in pre-
cision, and the demand for precision varies with the circum-
stance, or the nature of the interaction in which identification is
an issue. We may think of identification as a continuum ranging
from complete certainty at one end, to invisibility at the other.32
Both certainty and invisibility are idealized and unattainable. At
best, certainty might mean that the person identified through
one procedure is the same person who would be identified by a
large number of other independent means. This is the level of
identification that is implied by the mathematical sign of equal-
ity. Practically, this means that the Davy Jones who stands before
the clerk in the liquor store on New Years Eve, is the same Davy
Jones who was born to Ralph and Elizabeth Jones in Bayonne,
NewJersey at 4:27 in the morning on December 28, 1979. What
matters in this particular circumstance, of course, is that Davy has
provided some token of identification that indicates that he is at
least twenty-one years of age, and therefore has the right to
purchase a six-pack of alcoholic beverages. Neither his name,
nor any other aspects of his identity are ordinarily considered to
be relevant to this particular transaction. 3
Not all interactions or transactions require the same level of
identification. Indeed, most genuinely require no identification
at all. Transactions that involve credit, or some other contractual
assumptions about payment, or satisfactory performance, may
require some form of reliable identification. However, the ease
with which tokens of identity may be forged, or stolen, has raised
Racial Classifications Based on Insights Gleaned from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REv.
887 (1996).
31. See RANDALL BARTLETT, ECONOMICS AND POWER: AN INQUIRY INTO
HUMAN RELATIONS AND MARKETS (1989); Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and
Economics, the Culture of Deindividualization, the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J.
709 (1995).
32. Invisibility is used as an indication of the absence of identification
because under that condition, no information about an individual is available
as a basis for characterization.
33. See Roger Clarke, Anonymous, Pseudonymous and Identified Transactions:
The Spectrum of Choice (extended abstract, visited Feb. 17, 2000) <http://
www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/UIPP99EA.html>; Roger Clarke,
When Do They Need to Know "Whodunnit?" The Justfication for Transaction Identifica-
tion; The Scope for Transaction Anonymity and Pseudonymity (visited Mar. 20, 2000)
<http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/PaperCFP95.html>.
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the general level of concern about authentication or verification
of identity.
Some tokens require the actor or agent who accepts the
token to participate in the process of authentication. Routines of
verification may involve asking questions that the person present-
ing the token would be expected to know. Sophisticated tokens,
such as those with embedded chips may reveal the authentication
code only to the agent.34 Transactions in cyberspace generally
do not involve a human agent, and increasingly may be com-
pleted entirely by means of autonomous software agents." Ordi-
narily, authentication will depend upon a variety of routines
including passwords, and increasingly, biometric identifiers.36 In
the foreseeable future we can expect to see more personal com-
puters delivered with cameras as well as microphones installed as
a matter of course. The routine use of biometric techniques is
likely to develop as a way of ensuring that the user has been relia-
bly identified.37
Authentication in support of cyberspace transactions may
require the participation of a trusted third party at some stage in
the relationship between consumer and provider. The develop-
ment of the technology, the routines, and the specification of the
roles and responsibilities involved in the implementation of digi-
tal signatures represent an area of intense interest and
uncertainty.
38
34. See Roger Clarke, Chip-Based ID: Promise and Peril (visited Apr. 1, 2000)
<http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/IDCards97.html>.
35. See J.J. BORKING ET AL., INTELLIGENT SoFTwARE AGENTS AND PRIVACY:
TURNING A PRIVACY THREAT INTO A PRIVACY PROTECTOR (1999).
36. SeeJohn D. Woodard, Biometric Scanning Law & Policy: Identifying the
Concerns-Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. Pir. L. REv. 97 (1997).
37. IriScan, a corporation that specializes in the development and mar-
keting of iris recognition technology has introduced a product for use with the
personal computer. Its PC Iris product uses a hand-held personal iris imager
that functions as a computer peripheral. According to its promotional
material:
After the PC Iris system is installed, the user simply holds the imager
in his hand, looks into the camera lens from a distance of about 3"-4",
and presses the start switch to initiate the identification process. If the
presented iris matches a valid IrisCode for that system, privileges are
granted within seconds.
IriScan Press Kit (visited Dec. 1998) <www.iriscan.com>.
38. See Adam White Scoville, Clear Signatures, Obscure Signs, 17 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1999); see alsoJohn C. Anderson & Michael L. Closen,
Document Authentication in Electronic Commerce: The Misleading Notary Public Analog
for the Digital Signature Certification Authority, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 833 (1999); Kalama M. Lui-Kwan, Electronic Commerce: Digital Signatures:
Recent Developments in Digital Signature Legislation and Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 463 (1999).
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Reliable authentication helps to establish the requisite level
of confidence that both parties to a transaction are who they say
they are. While there is well-placed concern about fraudulent
representation on the part of commercial vendors, or others
seeking to take advantage of consumers,3 9 our attention will be
focused on the use of authentication, and identification in the
context of what we would otherwise identify as legitimate transac-
tions. Our concerns about invidious distinctions and patterns of
discrimination are not activated at this level of identification.
Those concerns begin to take shape when transaction-processing
systems are charged with responsibility for knowing whether a
given person is, or is not what she says she is. It is at this point
that the assumptions of Peter Steiner's smug little pooch come
under challenge."a
The use of tokens of identification and authentication rou-
tines as a means of determining whether the user is authorized to
use the computer, or to access particular files may be quite rea-
sonable.4 Indeed, systems operators, like the vendors of alco-
holic beverages may be required under the law to determine
whether an individual is beyond some specified age, or does not
reside in a jurisdiction that finds graphic sexual material beyond
any redeemable social value.4 2
Providers of information services may reasonably seek to
determine whether the visitor to the site is a registered sub-
scriber. In similar fashion, systems operators may reasonably
seek to determine whether visitors to interactive Web sites, such
as chat rooms, newsgroups, forums, and Virtual Reality (VR)
environments are qualified.43 Membership in particular popula-
tions or social categories may be established as a qualification for
entry.44
39. SeeJohn Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyber-
space Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893 (1999).
40. Peter Steiner's famous dog (cartoon) exclaims "On the Internet,
nobody knows you're a dog." NEW YORKR, July 5, 1993, at 61.
41. Jerry Kang has proposed an operational standard of "functionally nec-
essary use" that limits the use of personal data to that which is needed to com-
plete a particular transaction. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1293-94 (1998).
42. See Noah Levine, Note, Establishing Legal Accountability for Anonymous
Communication in Cyberspace, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1526 (1996).
43. See Chris Kramarae, A Backstage Critique of Virtual Reality, in CYBER-
SOCIETY 36, 56 (Steven G. Jones ed., 1995).
44. Membership agreements may require considerable detail about indi-
viduals. The criteria established for membership may exclude individuals on
the basis of categorical distinctions, including those generally treated as suspect
because they ask about age, gender, as well as race and ethnicity. See Philip
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It has been argued, however, that the determination of the
status of an individual as authorized to access information or to
participate in a variety of interactions within electronic environ-
ments need not require any further identification of the individ-
ual. That is, once qualified, further transactions or interaction
may be entirely anonymous, or pseudonymous.4 5
III. PROFILES
As Agre reminds us, there is no assumption that our desktop
computer either knows, or cares who is using it.46 However, it is
in the nature of the Internet Protocol (IP) that personally identi-
fiable information is made available for capture in every interac-
tion between computers. The amount of personal information
that is made available without the knowledge or consent varies as
a function of the ways in which consumers are connected to the
Internet. The Internet Service Provider (ISP) will require some
form of identification, at the very least a user identification
name, and a password. The user's IP address is personally identi-
fiable information that is automatically exchanged in establish-
ing the communications link. This address is generally stored by
Web servers, and is frequently passed on to third parties for pur-
poses of justifying claims for compensation by advertisers. The
IP address contains information about the domain, the com-
puter, the browser software, and a user account name that is
likely to bear features in common with the user's own name.4 7
Of particular importance for the development of user
profiles is the fact that each visit by the consumer to a Web site is
recorded electronically. This information not only includes the
date and time of each visit to specific resources on the server, but
the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the referring server.
Kang notes that when the reference is from a search engine, the
keyword or search term that was used is also delivered.4" A fur-
ther complication is involved in the increasing use of tracking
systems that deliver this user information to other servers without
the user's knowledge.4 9
Giordano, Invoking Law as a Basis for Identity in Cyberspace, 1998 STAN. TECH. L.
REv. 1, 79.
45. It is important, however, to distinguish between those types of interac-
tion where the participants may remain anonymous to other participants, but
may be uniquely, and reliably identified to the system operator or host.
46. See generally Agre, supra note 1.
47. See Kang, supra note 41, at 1224-30.
48. See id.
49. The ability of Web providers to insert hidden links into downloaded
pages allows these links to direct users' browsers to sites that they may not have
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Great concern has been expressed regarding the common
practice of Web servers to identify individual users by storing an
identifying code, a "cookie," that is stored on the consumer's
hard drive until it is erased. Cookies facilitate the compilation of
detailed records of a user's visits over an extended period of
time. Additional techniques for delivering consumer's IP
address to third party servers continue to be developed. 0
Data mining is the term used to describe the technological
approach to deriving strategic information from transaction-gen-
erated data. Whenever an individual engages in a transaction
that utilizes a networked computer, a record of that transaction is
generated, stored, and at some point, may be integrated into a
dataset that can be mined for insights about underlying patterns
of relationships. While transactions involving purchase and
rental agreements are the primary sources of this increasingly val-
uable transaction data, even the search for information provides
useful additions to this growing resource pool.51 Because of
improvements in the transmission of data, and dramatic reduc-
tions in the cost of storage and processing, the development of
data warehouses invites the collection and integration of previ-
ously unrelated bits of information about consumers'
transactions.
Data mining has a particularly troublesome aspect, as it
relates to informed consent. Consumers can not provide truly
informed consent regarding the use of transaction-generated
information. Consumers can not possibly know how the infor-
mation might ultimately be combined in order to produce some
of those "valuable nuggets of information."5" Those engaged in
data mining have no predetermined hypotheses regarding the
relationships they might uncover. "The data miner does not
know, cannot know at the outset, what personal data will be of
value or what relationships will emerge. Therefore, identifying a
primary purpose at the beginning of the process, and then
restricting one's use of the data to that purpose are the antithesis
of a data mining exercise."" A variety of analytical techniques,
visited on their own. This feature is used to elevate the reported statistics of
commercial sites, especially those that are involved in the provisions of sexual
content. However, such unauthorized forwarding of client requests is also rou-
tinely used in the measurement of mainstream Web sites. See Kang, supra note
41, at 1228-30 (discussing these techniques).
50. See generally BORKING ET AL., supra note 35.
51. See Ann Cavoukian, Data Mining: Staking a Claim on Your Privacy, Infor-
mation and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://
www.ipc.on.ca/web._site.eng/MATTERS/SUM-PAP/PAPERS/datamine.htm>.
52. Id. at 5.
53. Id. at 11.
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including those that make use of neural networks and other tech-
niques are relied upon to identify and define "associations,
sequences, classifications, clusters" and forecasts.54
The most important products of data mining are the unique
classifications of "types" of consumers, or information seekers,
that can be characterized further by the addition of demographic
information. 5 Members of the "Individual Reference Industry"
claim that they limit their efforts to the most socially responsible
activities. These activities include the prevention of fraud, con-
sumer protection, locating organ donors, and providing assist-
ance in child support cases.5 6 Yet there are numerous other
information vendors who specialize in providing individually
identifiable information specifically for the purpose of enabling
marketing discrimination.
We can understand the great variety in the sorts of con-
sumer/citizen/person types that can be generated through data
mining by considering the ways in which simple queries of
geodemographic databases might be used.5 7 A query of a
geodemographic database would permit the identification of all
the people within a given city, or county, or neighborhood whose
income is likely to exceed some figure. They might also be iden-
tified on the basis of their ownership of particular automobiles,
their purchase of gourmet foods, their membership in fraternal
organizations, or the extent to which their preferences for
action-adventure exceeds some criterion level.5"
54. Id. at 6.
55. It is important to emphasize the relative ease with which individually
identifiable information about a broad range of interests and activities can be
acquired legally within the information marketplace. See, e.g., Andrew L. Sha-
piro, Privacy For Sale: Peddling Data on the Internet, THE NATION, June 23, 1997, at
16; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Doors Fling Open to Public Records (visited Apr. 12,
2000) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/frompost/march98/privacy
9.htm>.
56. See generally Piper & Marbury L.L.P., White Paper Individual Reference
Services (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.search3.knowx.com/home/home.
exe?form=whitepaperl.htm>.
57. See John Goss, Marketing the New Marketing: The Strategic Discourse of
Geodemographic Information Systems, in GROUND TRUTH: THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 130, 170 (John Pickles ed., 1995) [herein-
after GROUND TRUTH]; see also Michael Curry, Geographic Information Systems and
the Inevitability of Ethical Inconsistency, in GROUND TRUTH, supra, at 68, 129; John
Goss, We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You Live: The Instrumental Ration-
ality of Geodemographic Systems, 71 ECON. GEO. 171 (1995).
58. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GETrING TO
KNOW DESKTOP GIS (1995) (providing examples of the kinds of queries
described in an introduction to a popular desktop Geographic Information Sys-
tem (GIS), ArcView). This introduction discusses the great variety of data that
can be purchased in the market (and acquired online) that includes informa-
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Providers of Web-based information services have increas-
ingly turned towards advertising as a means of survival within an
environment in which the dominant culture is hostile toward the
idea of paying for information.59 Advertising in the context of
the World Wide Web is valuable to the extent that it can be
targeted to categories of individuals who have by their recent
behavior, "self-identified" as a member of a target group.
60
Conflicts emerge most critically in the context of Internet
service providers, such as American Online, that have a special
relationship with their member/subscribers. Because these por-
tals provide a broad range of interactive services that vary sub-
stantially in terms of the economic value and the sensitivity of the
information that can be captured and stored by the provider dur-
ing the ordinary course of business. These providers will almost
certainly make use of transaction-generated information to
improve their service to their members,61 and we would assume
tion about the age, sex, race, income, as well their demand for a variety of
health care services. ESRI demonstrates the usefulness of ArcView for the
targeting of particular consumers through a fictional example. "Michael," seek-
ing to determine the best location for his "Wild Outdoors" store, makes use of
ArcView's "Query Builder" to identify those census tracts where at least 10 per-
cent of the households would be members of four segments that he believes to
be his most likely customers. The most likely and valuable customers are those
in the segment identified as "Movers and Shakers," although Michael is willing
to risk investing in the segment identified as "Successful Singles." Id. at 103-20.
The ArcView software, in combination with the consumer data available from
an army of vendors, makes it relatively easy for individuals to engage in
geodemograhic segmentation and targeting. The specialized techniques devel-
oped by Jonathan Robbin, and marketed widely through his Claritas Corpora-
tion, have become an off-the-shelf aid to marketplace discrimination. For the
history of Geodemographic clustering, see MICHAEL J. WEISS, THE CLUSTERING
OF AMERICA (1988).
59. See HowARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 65, 109 (1993).
This is a concern that emerges repeatedly in the context of discussions about
copyright management technology. SeeJulie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anony-
mously: A Closer Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981,
1039 (1996); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at
the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause and the First
Amendment, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999).
60. See generally Sharon Machlis, Net Bids for Ads Tests Privacy: Deja News
Develops Plans to Better Target Advertising on its Web Site, COMPUTERwORLD, June 29,
1998, at 3.
61. See generally Ellen M. Kirsh et al., Recommendations for the Evolution of
Cyberlaw, 2 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (visited June 25, 1999) <http://
www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol2/issue2/kirsh.html>. Kirsh and her colleagues argue
that interactive service providers "need" to provide their independent content
providers, their advertisers, merchants and other partners with "aggregate
information" that can be used for editorial, programming, and demographic
analysis. They suggest that the absence of reliable audience data keeps elec-
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that they would avoid those uses that might generate substantial
doubt or mistrust regarding the use of personal information.62
Yet, the tempting appeals from advertisers to supply more and
more detailed information about member/subscribers may be
irresistible.
Robin Mansell and her colleagues at the University of Sussex
have explored the problems that commercial developers of "vir-
tual communities" are facing as the potential for secondary
exploitation of the information generated within these commu-
nities increases.63 Among the issues that have emerged are many
which have to do with the nature of identity and identification.
Within the "gift economies" that are common to virtual commu-
nities, there is genuine value in the identities that have been
formed through interaction within the community over time.64
Their identity within the group bears no necessary relationship
to any identity, or systems of identification that operate outside
the virtual community. Yet, for a number of legal and financial
reasons, the provider, or entities in partnership with the Internet
Service Provider (ISP), may wish to link virtual identities with
identities in the "real world."
Virtual communities and groups may establish their own
rules about the nature and extent of identification within a par-
ticular locale that may differ from the more general rules estab-
lished by the service provider. The rules may vary as a function
of the sorts of transactions or interactions most likely to take
tronic publishers from garnering revenue from advertisers. Indeed they sug-
gest that armed with transaction-generated data, providers will be able to
'present the user with information she might want or need before she even
realizes it exists." Id. Denying providers access to the data to meet these legiti-
mate needs would keep them from serving their customers. Kirsh and her col-
leagues were attorneys employed by American Online when this article was
published.
62. Of course, service providers are repeatedly surprised by the hostile
reaction of consumers to what they saw as innovative, harmless uses of transac-
tion-generated information. The response of IBM's chairman, Louis Gerstner,
to the release of information about what books IBM employees were buying
from Amazon.com was anything but pleasant, and was accompanied by the
threat of a corporate boycott. See Ira Sager, How Amazon Got on IBM's Bad Side,
Bus. WK., Sept. 27, 1999, at 6; see alsoJeri Clausing, IntelAlters Plan Said to Under-
mine PC Users' Privacy (visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/
tech/99/01 /cyber/articles/26intemet.html>.
63. ROBIN MANSELL ET AL., SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY RESEARCH,
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX, NET COMPATIBLE. VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES, INTELLIGENT
AGENTS AND TRUST SERVICE PROVISION FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1998).
64. The value of one's reputation as a source of useful information, good
humor, or common sense is an asset that is built up over time, and may be
linked to a purely pseudonymous identity within the context of a virtual com-
munity such as a MUD, or MOO, or even a newsgroup.
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place within those cyberspaces. Jerry Kang has identified three
different sorts of spaces in which rules regarding racial identifica-
tion might be established.65 Those spaces identified most readily
with commercial transactions would be characterized by the
absence of racial identifiers. Those spaces in which non-eco-
nomic social interaction is more likely, authenticated racial iden-
tification might be required or facilitated. A third variety of
cyber-spaces would include those in which identity play is com-
mon and where racial identification may be presented, but not
authenticated.
The problems involved in facilitating the transfer of identity
between cyberspaces without violating the rules governing the
nature of identification are substantial.66 Yet, they pale in com-
parison with the temptation to acquire, combine, and interpret
the information generated through interactions and transactions
in these spheres. The fact that a large number of the most highly
visible portal and virtual communities, and transaction service
providers make use of intelligent agents and other techniques to
capture transaction generated information is consistent with this
view.
67
Problems with maintaining a trusted relationship with users
have led service providers to establish personalized or "custom-
ized" points of entry which gather personal information at the
time of registration, and accumulate additional information
through transactions that are enabled through those personal-
ized pages. Although they have not been widely implemented, it
65. Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1130 (2000).
66. Of course, there is also the continuing need for protecting individuals
from those who would engage in deception, or hostile action requiring the use
of force, or police powers in the real world. See Rothchild, supra note 39
(describing deceptive marketing). For a discussion of the problems of the
development and enforcement of community standards within an electronic
community, see Julian Dibbell, Taboo, Consensus, and the Challenge of Democracy in
an Electronic Forum, in COMPUTERIZATION AND CoNTRovWRsY 552, 568 (Rob Kling
ed., 2d ed. 1996).
67. Robin Mansell and her colleagues interviewed top tier portals like
Yahoo, that began as search engines or directories, second tier sites that sup-
port virtual communities, including Tripod, as well as those like Auto-by-Tel
that provide referral services. See MANSELL, supra note 63. See also Noah Robis-
chon, Browser Beware, BRILL'S CONTENT MAG., July 1998, at 40, 44 (discussing the
ways in which Yahoo, Excite, and other providers have moved from information
providers to marketing resource). Robischon emphasizes the fact that searches
that utilize the "channels" provided by Yahoo and Excite give preferential treat-
ment to advertisers who are clients. See id.
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seems likely that some form of individualization with regard to
information collection and use will become standard.68
IV. DISCRIMINATION
The computer profile is a discriminatory technology. It is a
resource used to differentiate between persons and groups. We
are concerned about these distinctions because they nearly
always involve evaluation.69
While the popular perception of a profile is linked to a dos-
sier that contains exquisite detail about an individual, a cyber-
space profile is something different. A profile is primarily a list
of categories that have been determined to be relevant to some
administrative decision that must be made by an organization
with regard to an individual, a group, or a class. Individual cate-
gories or variables are the dimensions along which an entity may
be evaluated. Subsets of categories may be combined into an
index score. The fundamental purpose of a profile is the assign-
ment of an individual into a class or category that represents a
decision. This is a process of identification with a consequence.
There are at least three bases for concern regarding the use
of transaction-generated information for the classification of
individuals (profiling) for use in decisions that may determine
economic opportunity. First, the data may be erroneous or
incomplete. Second, the models used to interpret the relations
68. The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) represents one technical
response to the problem of negotiating agreements about the collection and
use of transaction-generated information. The technology, still under develop-
ment, would allow Web sites to identify their privacy practices, at the same time
that users can express their own preferences regarding the collection of use of
information generated by their use of the service. Optimally, the agent software
would be able to negotiate agreements on the fly, perhaps requiring active con-
sideration by the user only when standard options are not available. As cur-
rently being developed, agreements might involve a matrix of sensitivity defined
by the intersection of data categories and data practices. The most sensitive
might be demographic and preference data that could be disclosed to others
for marketing purposes. See Lorrie Faith Cranor & Joseph Reagle, Jr., Designing
a Social Protocol: Lessons Learned from the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project, Apr.
1998 version (visited Feb. 26, 2000) <http://www.w3.org/People/Reagle/
papers/tprc97/tprc-f2m3.html>.
69. Evaluation seems to be a fundamental aspect of the meanings we
assign to concepts and things. Repeated factor analysis of semantic differential
scale items consistently produce three dimensions: evaluation, potency, and
activity. Different concepts, such as father and mother can be located in mul-
tidimensional semantic space as a function of their differential weights on these
dimensions. I interpret this widespread tendency as evidence that difference
implies evaluation. See Donald K. Darnell, Semantic Differentiation, in METHODS
OF RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION 181, 196 (1998).
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between variables may be flawed. Third, the consequences that
flow from the use of the models may exacerbate existing
disparities.
70
Data may be in error for a variety of reasons. These include
the existence of biases in the systems that capture, process, and
report data as facts.71 That models may be in error hardly needs
statement. The fact that models are resistant to challenge, and
are little threatened by disconfirming evidence,72 is even more
worrisome when we recognize that these models are incorpo-
rated into the routine assessments that are made by computers.73
Another shortcoming that operates at the level of both theory
and data is the assumption that the identity of an individual can
be reduced, captured, or represented by measurable characteris-
tics. The fact that the most easily obtainable measure is that
which marks decisions about consumption suggests that the iden-
tities that can be constructed are unidimensional.7 ' Goss charges
70. See Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior
with Statistical Inference and Individualized judgement, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979)
(providing a comprehensive review and assessment of the arguments against
the use of predictive models to guide decisions about individuals). Professor
Underwood argues most convincingly in support of the demand that more than
simple correlation be the basis for a model's use. A causal theory is a basic
requirement, and for that theory to be useful, it must incorporate an apprecia-
tion of the options available to those about whom decisions will be made. See id.
at 1448.
71. We understand information generally as reflecting a set processes
that involve abstractions that introduce variation, if not error in the representa-
tion of facts in the real world. Robert M. Hayes describes this chain as a path
that moves from facts, through their representation in data, through their
processing into information, that might be communicated in ways that generate
understanding, that would become integrated within a comprehensive system
we would recognize as knowledge, and would be applied in the context of ethi-
cal decision making that we might recognize as having been wise. See Robert M.
Hayes, Measurement of Information Communication: A Set of Definitions, in BETWEEN
COMMUNICATION & INFORMATION 81, 103 (Jorge R. Schement & Brent D. Ruben
eds., 1993).
72. Melvin W. Reder discusses the failure of contrary empirical evidence
to weaken the commitment of economists to the "rational actor paradigm."
MELVIN W. REDER, ECONOMICS: THE CULTURE OF A CONTROVERSIAL SCIENCE 160
(1999).
73. See Brian Cantwell Smith, Limits of Correctness, in COMPUTERS IN COM-
PUTERIZATION AND CONTROVERSY 810, 825 (Rob Kling ed., 1996).
74. It is a common, but nevertheless important criticism of predictive
models. That which is easily measured is most likely to be included in the
model. The circumstances that determine which features of a complex social
environment will be subject to measurement are often ignored in the evalua-
tion of a model's specification. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 128; see also Wit-
LIAM H. DUrON & KENNETH L. KRAEMER, MODELING AS NEGOTIATING: THE
POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF COMPUTER MODELS IN THE POLICY PROCESS (1985).
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geodemographic analyses with being guilty of the "fetishization
of life-style" or presenting consumer life-styles "as if they were
independent of socioeconomic relations."75
The use of predictive models based on historical data is
inherently conservative. Their use tends to reproduce and rein-
force assessments and decisions made in the past. Examples
abound. Even though Cass Sunstein has suggested that statistical
discrimination may be economically rational,76 he suggests that
its social impact may be socially destructive because of the effect
that such decisions may have on the development of human capi-
tal. Those not yet in the market may observe the operation of
the market, and observe the meager returns to investment in
education and training. They may, as rational actors, decide that
it makes little sense to invest in education, when other activities
less beneficial to society as a whole may provide more immediate
rewards. Of course, the failure to invest in human capital, and
then to pursue disfavored alternatives for survival, only serve to




The development and use of consumer profiles facilitates
the use of market segmentation as a basis for increasing sales and
profits. Market segmentation is pursued along an almost unlim-
ited number of dimensions. 7' The social consequences that flow
from the use of market segmentation are seen as problematic by
many contemporary observers.79 Our concerns with regard to
the social consequences of segmentation tend to be focused on
segments based on demographic categories, including race and
ethnicity.8 ° Segmentation and targeting on the basis of revealed
preferences has not been subject to the same level of critical
review. Lambert has argued that market segmentation is a form
a marketing discrimination. He suggests that "[t]he best terms
75. JOHN Goss, WE KNOW WHO You AI 50 (1995).
76. Not only does he suggest that categorical behavior informed by ste-
reotypes may be economically rational as a basis for making employment deci-
sions, he goes on to suggest that such decisions are "entirely legitimate in most
settings." SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 151, 155.
77. See id. at 155, 162.
78. See generally JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING Up AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND
THE NEW MEDIA WORLD (1997).
79. See id. See also Elihu Katz, And Deliver Us from Segmentation, 546 ANNALS,
AAPSS 22, 33 (1996).
80. See generally OscAR H. GANDY, JR., RACE, ETHNICITY AND THE SEGMENTA-
TION OF MEDIA MARKETS IN MASS MEDIA AND SOCIETY (James Curran & Michael
Gurevitch eds., 3d ed. Forthcoming 2000).
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and conditions for credit cards, home equity loans, and other
forms of credit may now elude minorities not because a loan
officer turned them down, but because they never received an
offer in the first place.""1 This process becomes especially troub-
lesome in the context of an emerging tendency to send pre-
approved applications to selected consumers. He suggests that
unlawful discrimination might also be charged if the distribution
of offers reflect the identification of a neighborhood as being
ineligible on the basis of race. He suggests further that a success-
ful claim may also be made on the basis of advertising that avoids
minority media outlets.82
Many commentators emphasize the impact of segmentation
on the operation of the public sphere.8" C. Edwin Baker dis-
cusses the ways in which an advertiser-supported press may be
involved in the development of an inauthentic or "corrupt" seg-
mentation. Authentic segmentation would be related to "each
group's discursive development within the lifeworld in response
to each group's identification of its needs and values."'84 Corrupt
segmentation would, conversely, reflect the influence of money,
rather than group needs or values. Baker agrees that "[m] arket
steering can equally corrupt segmentation" and that "this corrupt
segmentation undermines both common discourse and self-gov-
erning group life."8 5
The social consequences that flow from consumer segmenta-
tion targeting are largely invisible to the participants in the con-
temporary debates about privacy and regulation of Internet
commerce because the attention of both scholars and policy
makers has been focused on the expressions of concern by
individuals.86
VI. PRIVACY POLICY
A focus on the concern of individuals about their own vul-
nerability is understandable. Even when the right of privacy is
81. Timothy C. Lambert, Fair Marketing: Challenging Pre-Application Lend-
ing Practices, 87 GEO. LJ. 2182, 2183 (1999).
82. See id. at 2208.
83. See, e.g., Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Dividing Practices: Segmentation and
Targeting in the Emerging Public Sphere (June 1998) (unpublished confer-
ence paper, on file with author).
84. C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317,
376 (1998).
85. Id. at 377.
86. See MARY CULNAN & SANDRA MILBERG, CONSUMER PRIVACY IN INFORMA-
TION PIIvAcY: LOOKING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK (Mary Culnan et al. eds., forth-
coming 2000)
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examined in the context of group rights, that right is understood
to have been derived from individual rights and from the bene-
fits of association.
8 7
One may argue that there is an intrinsic value in the group
as a social collective. This value is to be seen as part of a contin-
uum of existence that flows from personhood, through commu-
nality, to sociality. There may be a category of rights appropriate
for each." Garet challenges our assumptions about the basis for
our appreciation of groups. He argues that "[w] hile some groups
of importance in our lives are voluntary associations, others, of
perhaps greater moral bearing, are neither voluntary nor associa-
tive."" Instead, Garet argues, the Supreme Court has assigned
great value to the rights of groups that are "highly ascriptive;
membership is imputed rather than chosen in any ordinary
sense."9" While I cannot yet claim that the sorts of groups that
are created by means of their common victimization will eventu-
ally acquire a sense of solidarity and common purpose in opposi-
tion, their existence and their group status cannot be denied.
Privacy legislation has traditionally been concerned with
individually identifiable information. Information about groups,
or aggregates, is seen to be beyond the reach of privacy's scope.
Indeed, it has been suggested that because aggregate informa-
tion does not identify persons individually, there is no threat to
privacy. Even the most expansive efforts to limit the commercial
use of consumer information specify exceptions for aggregate
information.9 1 This does not mean that social groups, such as
87. See Edward J. Blaustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 Rurr.-CAm.
L.J. 219, 222 (1977).
88. See Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56
S. CAL. L. REv. 1001, 1075 (1983). Garet links our interest in personhood, soci-
ality, and communality with the ideals of the French Revolution in the call for
"LibertY, Egalit , Fraternit6." Id. at 1074.
89. Id. at 1043 (referring to the religious community in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), and the tribe in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978)).
90. Id. at 1046.
91. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (a)2
(A) (1995) explicitly excludes "any record of aggregate data which does not
identify particular persons." The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
§ 222 (c) (3) (1998), indicates that a telecommunications carrier "may use, dis-
close, or permit access to aggregate customer information," and more point-
edly, section (f) (2) defines aggregate customer information as "collective data
that relates to a group or category of services or customers, from which individ-
ual customer identities and characteristics have been removed." 47 U.S.C.
§ 222 (f) (2) (1998).
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women, have not been involved in presenting arguments about
the ways in which privacy laws affect their interests.
92
This does mean, however, that groups whose existence is
entirely conceptual, in that they are unknown to each other, have
little possibility of acting as a group. They are also unlikely to
realize the benefits of taking legal action as an aggrieved class or
otherwise shaping the privacy debate. Aggrieved individuals,
believing that others share their experience, may take the initia-
tive, and may even use the power of the Internet to identify
others and begin the process of interest group formation. Enter-
prising lawyer advocates may also assume the responsibility for
developing a plaintiff class and helping to shape its approach to
litigation.9" Whatever the process, the legitimate interest of
these groups in being spared the costs of invidious discrimina-
tion deserves consideration.
A. The Velvet Trap
The dominant trend within the debates surrounding privacy
and the emerging Internet is an embrace of the market as a solu-
tion to the problems of corporate abuse. Self-regulation is the
form that a marketplace solution would ultimately take. It is
argued that rational self-interest would govern choices made by
firms seeking to succeed in e-commerce. Competition is sup-
posed to ensure that firms cannot survive and prosper if they
engage in activities that consumers find objectionable. Yet, we
know that this idealized competitive market is rarely seen in the
world of flesh and blood,9" and is hard to imagine in cyberspace.
Jerry Kang examines the marketplace solution and suggests
that the strongest argument against it is one that is based on a
concern for the autonomous individual.95 Part of this critique
suggests that consent within this market is not voluntary, but
coerced. Consent in this market is also uninformed because of
the informational asymmetry that characterizes most market
transactions. Not only are consumers unaware of the nature of
92. The claims by feminists that privacy rights have served to create and
perpetuate women's unequal status certainly qualifies as an example. See Linda
C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Femnist Conception of Privacy, 40 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 759, 793 (1999). See also PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE
POLITICS OF INTiMATE LIFE 132-56 (1996) (discussing issues related to gay and
lesbian identity and the practice of outing).
93. See generally Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the Disadvan-
taged: Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2449 (1999).
94. See ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS
OF MARKETS (1999).
95. See Kang, supra note 41, at 1265-66.
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the informational dimensions of their transactions, they are espe-
cially unaware of the consequences that flow from the use of
their transaction-generated information in the development of
profiles. Indeed, I would argue that they are largely unaware
that they are even participating in what is being discussed as a
"second exchange," where some "intangible benefits" like
"higher quality service" and "personalized offers" are received in
exchange for the right to use personal information.96 As Culnan
and Milberg note, because Web servers capture information
about browsing, as well as information about actual transactions,
this so-called "second exchange" often takes place before, and in
many cases, without the primary exchange ever taking place.
9 7
B. First Principles
Kang offers recommendations for the establishment of par-
ticular default rules that would govern the flow of personal infor-
mation in the absence of explicit contracts governing
transactions. He bases his recommendations on the concept of
functional necessity. He determines that the "processing of per-
sonal information for any form of advertising-even when that
advertising is done by the information collector-is not function-
ally necessary. Disclosing personal information to third parties
to do the same would, afortiori, not be functionally necessary."98
We have little reason to expect, or even to hope that Kang's
default rules might actually reach this fundamental limitation.
Instead, we have to look for any signs that the policy system is
even open to the possibility of establishing limits on the power of
business to exploit identity and identification without regard to
the consequences.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) clearly reflects the
view that self-regulation is preferable to the more active regula-
tory stance favored by members of the European Community. 99
The Commission's recent assessment of industry practice has
96. See Mary J. Culnan & Sandra Milberg, Consumer Privacy (visited Apr.
14, 1999) <http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/research/conspriv.pdf>.
97. Id. at 14. Other observers note that many consumers make use of the
Internet to gather information about products that they will purchase in neigh-
borhood stores because of the benefits associated with being able to return and
exchange goods.
98. Kang, supra note 41, at 1272.
99. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY
ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (visited Sept. 1, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/
1999/9907/privacy99.pdf> [hereinafter FTC]; see also Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy
Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is
Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REv. 847 (1998);Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans'
Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771 (1999).
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been focused on the extent to which the information practices of
the most popular commercial Web sites implement each of "four
substantive fair information practice principles" that have
emerged as the de facto standard in the United States.
The four principles include the most fundamental-that
consumers should be informed about information practices
before the information is collected.' 0 Once informed, a second
core principle makes sense-that consumers be given the oppor-
tunity to choose options based upon their understanding of how
those options might govern the collection and use of personal
information.
The third principle would ensure that consumers have "rea-
sonable" access to the information about them that has been col-
lected, as well as an opportunity to "contest" the data's accuracy
and completeness. Finally, consumers would be assured that
their information would be secure from unauthorized use. The
Commission concluded that while some progress had been made
since their 1998 report, few of the busiest Web sites had imple-
mented all four principles to the Commission's satisfaction.' 01
Yet, on the basis of the evidence available to them, the Commis-
sion concluded that it would not be appropriate for the govern-
ment to pursue a legislative or regulatory solution at this time.
Neither the FTC nor the Department of Commerce appear
likely to include the "Use Limitation Principle" in any Codes of
fair information practices that will be used in evaluating the
Internet marketplace. The Use Limitation Principal, which is a
close correlate of the principle that the use of information
should be fully specified at the time of collection, suggests that
personal data should not be disclosed, made available or other-
wise used for purposes other than those specified initially.
10 2
The development of consumer profiles, especially those that are
developed by means of data mining operations that combine
information from a broad range of transactions, cannot be
understood as being consistent with this principle. Data mining
100. What matters of course, is that consumers understand the ways in
which transaction generated information is used in the creation of profiles that
are then used in determining their access to opportunities, and advantages in
future transactions, or in unexpected barriers to other important opportunities.
The questions proposed for consideration during the workshop revealed a con-
siderable awareness of the nature of profiling, but a lack of understanding of
the relationship between organizations that produce profiles, and their clients.
101. See FTC, supra note 99, at 6.
102. See OECD Privacy Guidelines, in THE PRIvAcY LAw SOURCEBOOK 181
(Marc Rotenberg ed., 1999).
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is, by definition, a secondary use.1" 3 And under these interna-
tional principles, "requires the explicit consent of the data sub-
ject or consumer."1"4
It is also abundantly clear that data mining is not, and is not
very likely to ever be an open and transparent activity. Privacy
Commissioner Ann Cavoukian suggests: "Even consumers with a
heightened sense of privacy about the use and circulation of
their personal information would have no idea that the informa-
tion that they provided for the rental of a movie or a credit card
transaction could be mined and a detailed profile of their prefer-
ences developed."' 0 5
It is also not clear whether the organizations making use of
data mining technology would be prepared to reveal to consum-
ers the nature of their profiles, as the FTC code suggests. 10 6 Nor
is it clear that an individual consumer should be expected to pro-
vide an informed and compelling challenge to any aspect of their
individual profiles. Literally thousands of transactions by one
person are interpreted in the context of thousands more made
by many thousands of unidentified others.'0 7 This complexity is
simply not open to challenge, even if it were presented to con-
sumers in some intelligible form.
The fact that the FTC, in cooperation with the Department
of Commerce, announced a workshop focusing on online profil-
ing and reported plans for an investigation of the use of elec-
tronic identifiers to track consumer behavior is encouraging.
Yet, there are few signs that the Commission, or any other federal
agency appears prepared to engage the hard questions about the
ways in which transaction-generated information is used to iden-
tify the groups which will be the targets of market segmentation
and other forms of discrimination. 10 8
103. See Robert 0. Harrow, Jr., Are Data Firms Getting Too Personal? (visited
May 4, 1999) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/frompost/march98/
privacy8.htm>. Harrow notes that the number of firms engaged in data mining
numbers in the thousands, up from a few hundred in the recent past.
104. Cavoukian, supra note 51, at 10
105. Id. at 11.
106. See Harrow, supra note 103 (identifying Acxiom Corp. as an industry
leader in data mining and supplier of consumer information to advertisers that
argues that it would be impractical to provide individuals with access to their
files).
107. See H. Jefferson Smity, Do Data Warehouses Challenge Fair Play? Com-
puters and Society (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http://www.ibm.com/OtherVoices/
BeyondComputing/May2397185954.phtml>.
108. It will be essential for the government agencies responsible for the
oversight of cyberspace transactions to understand the ways in which discrimi-
nation by profile actually works. While organizations that mail special offers, or
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If we pursue the interest of those groups who are the victims
of invidious distinction and marketing discrimination, we might
ask which group should we protect first?
VII. IN DEFENSE OF INVISIBLE GROUPS
Charles Raab and Colin Bennett have asked about the distri-
bution of privacy risks.1" 9 They explicitly consider the possibility
that policy actors may need to identify "particularly vulnerable
social groups" for the purpose of building coalitions and mobiliz-
ing advocates who support their specific interests, as well as those
organizations concerned with civil liberties more generally. They
note that policy discourse that is concerned with "fair informa-
tion principles" is generally not concerned with achieving equal-
ity. They note as well, that in the United States, the general
practice is one that leaves "it largely to individuals themselves to
pursue complaints and to seek remedies."' 0 The policy problem
is not appreciably less troublesome in the European context.
There, we observe a concern with "different kinds of data, and
not of different kinds of persons."1 '
Raab and Bennett suggest that different sorts of social identi-
ties might be specified in the context of the kinds of relation-
ships that characterize different sectors within the society. Thus
there are groups that can be defined as customers, patients, sus-
pects, students, and taxpayers. There are also groups that can be
defined on the basis of still other categories that exist outside
explicit relationships, but along some continuum: young/old,
rich/poor, native/immigrant, etc. The complexities emerge, as
we have noted, with regard to complex identities, as individuals
navigate a great variety of sectors, and interact with institutional
others from behind an assortment of presentational masks. As
Raab and Bennett suggest, no simple aggregation can even rep-
resent the essence of a person.
11 2
Surveys of consumers indicate a high level of concern about
the loss of privacy. Yet, the numbers of respondents who say they
have been victims of an "invasion of their privacy" is compara-
present banners with discounted offers to pre-selected browsers may be both
able and willing to supply the lists of those who are given offers. The multitudes
who are not provided the discount of special opportunity are unlikely to be
supplied.
109. See Raab & Bennett, supra note 20, at 274.
110. Id. at 265.
111. Id. at 266.
112. See id. at 267.
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tively low. 113 The surveys reflect a high level of perceived risk.
Perceived risk is the basis upon which individuals decide whether
to venture into transactions with strangers, or even decide to
invest in the technology that would enable such transactions.
Perceived risk may explain some part of the persistence of a "dig-
ital divide." This risk may be distributed unequally. However,
when we engage the problem of risk, we are necessarily taken out
of the realm of objective statistics, and into the uncertainty of
perception. While there is still debate about the nature and
extent of racial discrimination, there are at least standards, tests,
and measures upon which comparisons can be made. There are
no such standards in the area of perceived risk. The perception
of risk is shaped by a complex of factors including the nature of
the hazard and the way it has been portrayed in the press,114 as
well as by the sense of power and efficacy that varies systemati-
cally with race, gender, age and income." 5 This complexity
ensures that no broad standards will ever appear.
In the context of discrimination more generally, it has been
suggested that special protections for social groups and their
members should be based on their actual or potential political
power. The assumption here is that groups with political power
can use that power to pursue their interests in the courts or
through legislative representatives. Kenji Yoshimo elaborates on
this argument in the context of the government's "don't ask,
don't tell" policy governing homosexuals in the military.' 6 After
suggesting that the courts might withhold the grant of "height-
ened scrutiny" from groups that can change or conceal their
defining traits, Yoshimo argues that neither mutability nor invisi-
bility are really determinants of political power." 7 It is only
113. A survey administered mid-year in 1998 asked consumers "how con-
cerned are you about threats to your personal privacy in America today." Some
87% said they were concerned, and more than half said they were very con-
cerned. Yet, when asked if they had ever personally been the victim of "an
improper invasion of privacy by a business" only 41 % said that this had hap-
pened to them. See Center for Social and Legal Research, P&AB Survey Over-
view: Consensual Marketing is Coming, 6 PmtvAcy & AM. Bus. 1 (1999).
114. See ELEANOR SINGER & PHYLLIS ENDRENY, REPORTING ON RISK: How
THE MASS MEDIA PORTRAY AccIDENTS, DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND OTHER HAZARDS
(1993).
115. See James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perceptions of Environmental
Health Risks, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1101, 1108 (1994); see also Roger E. Kasperson &
Jeanne X. Kasperson, The Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk, 545
ANNALS, AAPSS 95, 105 (1996).
116. Kenji Yoshimo, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Pre-
sumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", 108 YALE L.J. 485, 571 (1998).
117. People who are subject to excessive attention by police, especially
customs agents because of the way they look, are advised to change their
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when invisibility is compelled, that the outcome is
disempowerment. 118
Yoshimo's ultimate recommendation is that the jurispru-
dence of heightened scrutiny should be reconstructed solely on
the basis of an analysis of political powerlessness. Yet, a further
distinction is made. The traditional view is characterized as
being class based, in which women, blacks, and gays are members
of disempowered classes. An emergent view is one that is based
on classification (or identification). The distinction would not
be based on classes, but on the classifications or distinctions that
create the classes (race, sex, or sexual orientation). The
expressed value, according to Yoshimo is one of symmetry: "[I]f
blacks get heightened scrutiny, so must whites." '119 This is the
view that appears to be in ascendance within the U.S. courts.
I recognize that where political power may be the appropri-
ate standard with regard to the courts, it is obvious that a very
different standard of power operates within the marketplace.
Unless minority tastes are combined with considerable wealth or
disposable income, they are not honored in the market.12 ° That
they are not heard in the market for information is even more
troubling, for many of the reasons we have already reviewed. 21
The challenge is to transform the lack of political power that may
justify heightened scrutiny within the courts into a comparable
level of scrutiny within the marketplace.
VIII. TOWARD GENERAL STANDARDS
As scholars and activists work toward the development of the
means for defining and measuring the actual, perceived, and
dynamic vulnerability of groups within markets and public
spheres, there remains a pressing need for us to establish a more
general policy to govern transactions in cyberspace.
appearance. This is not empowering, but submission to the use of an invidious
distinction.
118. See id. at 557.
119. 1& at 563
120. Substantial evidence has been developed that demonstrates the low
value that advertisers place on gaining access to African American audiences.
Radio stations that program to these audiences receive a smaller share of adver-
tiser revenue for each rating point than do stations that program for main-
stream audiences. See CIVIL RIGHTS FORUM ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, WHEN
BEING No. 1 Is NOT ENOUGH: THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING PRACTICES ON MINOR-
rlY-OWNED & MINORlnY-FORMATrED BROADCAST STATIONS (1999).
121. See Edward S. Herman, Commodifcation of Culture, in TRIUMPH OF THE
MARKET 3, 11 (1995).
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The Federal Trade Commission has settled rather selectively
on a subset of the OECD privacy guidelines. As a result, they
have weakened their usefulness as a standard. The Commission
must be challenged to explain why they have pulled back so far
from a standard that seems on its face to have been very well
considered. Joel Reidenberg has argued persuasively for the
implementation of these standards in the context of a withering
critique of information practices within the direct marketing
industry.1 22 Reidenberg has also been clear in his objections to
reliance on the marketplace to develop and enforce these stan-
dards. His works have undoubtedly fallen upon deaf ears. Per-
haps the Commission might respond more favorably to the
recommendations of social scientists, rather than legal scholars.
Gary Marx has proposed twenty-nine questions that he suggests
that those who engage in surveillance might ask themselves as
they plan the collection and use of personal information. 12' The
Federal Trade Commission, as well as the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, and perhaps the Office of Management and
Budget should consider the adoption of questions of this sort as
the basis of evaluating the information practices of those organi-
zations for whom they have oversight responsibility.
122. SeeJoel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in
the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IowA L. REv. 497, 516-23 (1995). He has updated his
critique more recently in Reidenberg, supra note 99, at 792.
123. Gary T. Marx, Ethics for the New Surveillance, 14 INFO. Soc'Y 171, 174
(1998).
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